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Abstract—Deep learning architectures (DLA) have shown
impressive performance in computer vision, natural language
processing and so on. Many DLA make use of cloud computing
to achieve classification due to the high computation and memory
requirements. Privacy and latency concerns resulting from cloud
computing has inspired the deployment of DLA on embedded
hardware accelerators. To achieve short time-to-market and
have access to global experts, state-of-the-art techniques of
DLA deployment on hardware accelerators are outsourced to
untrusted 3rd parties. This outsourcing raises security concerns
as hardware Trojans can be inserted into the hardware design
of the mapped DLA of the hardware accelerator. We argue that
existing hardware Trojan attacks highlighted in literature have
no qualitative means how definite they are of the triggering of
the Trojan. Also, most inserted Trojans show a obvious spike in
the number of hardware resources utilized on the accelerator at
the time of triggering the Trojan or when the payload is active.
In this paper, we propose a hardware Trojan attack called
Input Interception Attack (IIA). In this attack we make use
of the statistical properties of layer-by-layer output to make
sure that asides from being stealthy, our IIA is able to trigger
with some measure of definiteness. This IIA attack is tested
on DLA used to classify MNIST and Cifar-10 data sets. The
attacked design utilizes approximately up to 2% more LUTs
respectively compared to the un-compromised designs. This
paper also discusses potential defensive mechanisms that could be
used to combat such hardware Trojans based attack in hardware
accelerators for DLA.
Index Terms—Convolution Neural Network, hardware accel-
erators, DLA Mapping, FPGA, 3-sigma
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning architectures (DLA) is fast becoming a de-
fault standard in computer vision applications [1]. DLA are de-
signed with computationally intensive convolution operations
[2] along with very memory centric multi-level perceptron
layers. [3].
DLA require huge quantity of training data to achieve good
accuracy. The training of DLA is often outsourced to untrused
third parties known as Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS)
as shown in Fig. 1. This trained model then can be deployed
into the hardware at another untrusted facility. Finally, this
product is provided to the customer who can make use of
such DLA based intelligent devices.
Fig. 1. Deep Learning Model Supply Chain
Software or hardware Trojans can be inserted into the DLA
by adversaries in any untrusted third party facilities of the
supply chain. For instance, in the training phase, security con-
cerns arise as 3rd party model designers or trainers have access
to training data sets, testing data sets, model architecture and
model parameters (weights and biases). In situations where
the model designer or trainer have malicious intent, malicious
synapses or neurons not included in the original model design
specifications can be hidden or embedded in the trained model
to cause mis-classification of the model at a later time when
triggered. [4].
After training, many DLA models make use of cloud
computing to achieve classification during inference phase to
overcome the high computation cost and memory require-
ments. Security, privacy and latency concerns because of cloud
computing have inspired the deployment of DLA models on
embedded hardware accelerators. To achieve short time-to-
market and have access to global experts, current state-of-the-
art techniques of DLA deployment on hardware accelerators, is
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Fig. 2. DLA Gray Box Attack
also outsourced to untrusted 3rd parties. Hardware Trojans can
be inserted into hardware accelerators for DLA architectures
in such untrusted 3rd parties. Such Trojans can cause mis-
classification when they are triggered as shown in Fig. 1.
Several hardware Trojan insertion techniques have been
explored for hardware accelerators for DLA architectures. Liu
et. al in [5] shows the possibility of a Trojan attack on neural
networks that helps to generate samples of the input data from
the pre-trained model. In this approach, they generate input
trigger that can induce malicious behavior of the neurons in
the model. Clements et. al [6] introduces a hardware Trojan
framework carried on IP designs. In this framework, input
image trigger is used to generate small bounded perturbations
that are added to targeted layers of the DLA to induce and
propagate malicious behaviour through the DLA layers leading
to mis-classification.
These above approaches require a introduction of malicious
functions or changing of the DLA parameters within the DLA
layers which will incur more hardware resources when the
Trojan is triggered and can consequently lead to detection.
Also, the attacker has no qualitative guarantee that the Trojan
will be triggered to achieve his objective because the trigger
is designed based on input image trigger that may never be
used by the end-user.
In this work, we consider a DLA as shown in Fig. 2. The
hardware designer has access to the model architecture, the
dimensions of the input matrix to the DLA and the dimensions
of the respective layer-by-layer feature maps. With access to
all these, the adversary can perform statistical analysis to
obtain boundary conditions that qualitatively guarantees the
Trojan triggering and also assures a high level of stealthiness.
In this paper, we propose a hardware Trojan attack called the
Input Interception Attack (IIA). This attack does not require
a change in parameters or introduction of malicious function
within the DLA layers to cause mis-classification. This attack
is designed to be perpetrated during the deployment of DLA
on the hardware as shown in Fig. 1. This Trojan attack is
comprises of 3 phases namely: statistical analysis of the output
features of each layer in DLA, the triggering circuit and
payload. The IIA remains dormant unless it is triggered based
on the statistical properties of certain output features of a
particular layer (any layer can be chosen by the attacker) of
DLA if these statistical properties satisfy the requirements for
the trigger of the the IIA. Once the payload is activated the
output of the DLA is compromised and consequently may lead
to mis-classification.
Our work has following major contributions. :
• Propose a novel and stealthy hardware Trojan attack
whose triggers is dependent upon the layer-by-layer out-
puts of the DLA architecture
• We propose solution schemes that can help the prevention
of insertion of hardware Trojans in the hardware imple-
mentation phase of DLA.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II describes the threat model. Section III discusses the pro-
posed attack design. Section IV shows experimental results
and discussion. Section V discusses coutermeasures against
hardware Trojans. Section VI provides related works and
comparison with state-of-the-art and Section VII concludes
the paper.
II. THREAT MODEL
The model adopted in this paper follows a Gray box
attack where the adversary have some knowledge but not the
full knowledge of the DLA architecture. The adversary is
placed at the hardware implementation phase of deep learning
architecture (DLA) as shown in Fig. 1. In this model, the
attacker has access to the DLA architecture, DLA parameters
and a validation data set only from the project owner. However,
the attacker does not have any information about training
and testing data samples. The validation data set is required
to verify and validate the implementation correctness of the
hardware design of the DLA.
III. ATTACK DESIGN
As stated earlier, the adversary has access to the parameters
and architecture of the DLA. This means that the adversary has
knowledge of the size of the input to the DLA and the layer-
by-layer outputs of the DLA to any random input that follows
the required size of the input to the DLA. The adversary
also has access to a validation data set provided by project
owner to help verify the correctness of the hardware design
and implementation.
The IIA design is divided into three phases namely:
• Statistical Analysis
• Trigger Design
• Payload Design
A. Statistical Analysis
After the hardware design, input images from the validation
sets are used to test and verify the correctness of the hardware
design simulations. The adversary has access to the respective
Fig. 3. Attack Design
Fig. 4. Numerical Distribution of Fully Connected Layer 1 Elements
layer-by-layer outputs of different input images to the DLA
hardware design. In this stage, 3-sigma limit calculation is
performed on the layer-by-layer outputs on validation data set
to obtain the numerical distribution, frequencies and bound-
aries of the elements in the respective layer-by-layer outputs.
To make the hardware Trojan stealthy but yet able to trigger
this calculation helps in determining very rare but still possible
range of output values that can be used for effective trigger
conditions.
From Fig. 4, statistical limits of numbers ranging from
1833 to 1943 and also numbers ranging from (-1906) to (-
1746) appears to be very rare and are suitable for stealthy
and effective boundary conditions for the design of the trigger
circuit.
B. Trigger Design
In this paper, statistical analysis is performed to obtain
3-sigma limit on the layer-by-layer output of the first fully
connected layer shown in the DLA Fig. 3. This helped us
obtain a range of values that are rarely possible to occur.
In the event when any element in the layer in question falls
within those rarely occurring values, the Trojan is triggered.
This paper assumes a validation data set of 100 images. These
100 images are used to simulate the hardware design to obtain
numerical distribution of the first fully connected (fc1) layer of
the DLA shown in Fig. 3 over the 100 images of the validation
data set. The numerical distribution of the fc1 layer is shown
in Fig 4. Numerical boundaries that lie between the 3-sigma
and 4-sigma statistical limits are selected to design the trigger
for the IIA. We called this range of values as the triggering
boundary conditions in this paper.
C. Payload Design
In the event of an image satisfies the triggerring boundary
conditions, the payload is designed to intercept and pass an
illegitimate image as input in the next image cycle with the
aim of causing mis-classification after which it resets itself
and allows the passage of legitimate inputs to the design.
This adversarial design stores the illegal images in a separate
memory location. Since the number of these illegal images
are very small therefore possible anticipated area overhead is
very small. The saved image(s) can be made up of random or
carefully selected pixel numbers that is passed through the
DLA architecture and results in classification that deviates
from the normal result leading to mis-classification. The
payload takes action in the next image cycle after the trigger
is activated. In order to make the payload more stealthy, we
make sure that after mis-classification is achieved, the payload
resets itself till the trigger is activated again. The Trojan design
is summarized in Fig 3. The effectiveness of the attack is
evaluated by measuring the following:
• Stealthiness: To measure the stealthiness of the attack, a
large number of images from the given data set is passed
through the compromised hardware design to observe the
amount of times the proposed triggering mechanism is
activated.
• Hardware resource utilization: This metric provides an
understanding of how much additional hardware re-
sources incurred as a result of the Trojan insertion in
the IP design. This is measured by the number of Block-
RAMs (BRAMs), Digital Signal Processors (DSPs), Flip-
Flops (FFs), Look-Up Tables (LUTs) and hardware la-
tency in comparison with a non-compromised hardware
design of the DLA.
TABLE I
HDRU FOR LENET DLA
BRAM DSPs Flip-Flops LUTs Latency (ms)
Original DLA 58 39 37750 42360 6.24205
Compromised DLA 58 39 37861 42741 6.24380
% Difference 0% 0% 0.294% 0.895% 0.0280%
TABLE II
HDRU FOR DLA ON CIFAR-10 ARCHITECTURE
BRAM DSPs Flip-Flops LUTs Latency(ms)
Original DLA 121 37 12311 16777 13.40099
Compromised DLA 121 37 12417 17141 13.40204
% Difference 0% 0% 0.857% 2.146% 0.0078%
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The IIA is implemented on DLA for Lenet and Cifar-10
architectures. respectively. To measure the stealthiness of the
attack, a total of 1000 images are passed through the hardware
design. The Trojan is triggered in 20 image instances based
on the chosen trigger conditions. The IIA has a 2% trigger
rate.
The Hardware Design Resource Utilization (HDRU) of
the compromised hardware design is obtained and compared
with the original hardware design. Tables I and II shows
the different hardware resources and latency required by the
original and the Trojan inserted hardware designs of the DLA
for the Lenet and Cifar 10 architectures respectively.
The Table I shows that the compromised HDRU uses
approximately 1% more LUTs, and 0.3% more flip-flops, com-
pared to the original (uncompromised) hardware design for the
LeNet architecture The compromised hardware design uses
the same amount of hardware resources in terms of BRAM
and DSPs when compared to the original DLA hardware
design. The latency of the compromised hardware design is
comparable as it is nominally increased by 0.0280%.
For Cifar 10 architecture, the Table II shows the HDRU
shows that the compromised design consumes 2% more LUTs
and 1% more flip-flops compared to the original DLA hard-
ware design which can also be considered tolerable. Again
the compromised hardware design uses the same amount
of hardware resources in terms of BRAM and DSPs when
compared to the original DLA hardware design. The latency of
the compromised hardware design increased very nominally to
about is 0.078% more compared to the original DLA hardware
design.
V. COUNTERMEASURES: DEFENSE MECHANISM
In this paper, a number of countermeasures are proposed
to either detect or prevent the insertion of proposed Trojans.
These countermeasures include:
A. Altered Validation data set
Based on the threat model adopted in this paper, the
adversary (hardware designer) requires a validation data set
to ensure the correct implementation of the DLA deployment
on hardware accelerators. The validation data set consists
of images used to confirm the prediction of the hardware
design from client with the prediction of the software trained
model provided by the project owner. To ensure the validation
data set does not serve as an avenue to compromise the
hardware design, each image pixel is changed scaling them
randomly to make the respective images in the validation data
set ambiguous and far from the actual image. This altered
validation data set is sent to the hardware designer to validate
the hardware design of deployment of DLA to the hardware
accelerator. Hence, the adversary cannot have access to the
actual layer-by-layer output to design an effective trigger. In
the event the adversary designs a trigger based on the altered
validation data set, the trigger conditions does not result in
effective and stealthy attack.
For illustration, consider
Matrix A of size mxm representing the image data
Matrix B of size nxn representing the a weight matrix.
Matrix C of size pxp representing the a output of convolu-
tion.
Such that:
A~B = C (1)
The altered image data sets, D is given as:
r ·A = D (2)
where r is a random and
D is a matrix of size nxn with ambiguous input pixels.
Hence,
D ~B = C ′ (3)
where C
′
is an ambiguous output of randomness the adver-
sary has access to. Since C and C
′
do not match, hence this
leads to erroneous results for adversary and may also lead to
Trojan which cannot be triggered.
B. Distributed DLA Layer Implementation
This defense mechanism proposes an approach where the
software trained DLA model which is composed of layers
are split into groups. Each group contains a subset of the
layers of the DLA model. Each group is then contracted
out to different non-related hardware designers to produce a
standalone hardware design of the implementation of subset
layers of the DLA. Each hardware design are then put side by
side to work together to perform classification. This approach
gives the adversary limited access to the parameters and the
layer-by-layer output of the DLA model. No adversary has
complete knowledge of the actual size of the input and output
to the overall DLA model. This is illustrated in Fig 5. The
DLA model for LeNet architecture in Fig 3 is split into groups
and contracted to different hardware designers to limit the
amount of knowledge that an individual hardware designer
has access to in order to attack the model.
Hence, with the limited information, Trojan insertion is
ineffective as the adversary has no means of measure the
stealthiness or effectiveness of the attack. This approach can
also be used as a countermeasure for other form of attacks
in literature as no adversary have access to full information
about the DLA network.
Fig. 5. Distributed DLA Layer Implementation
VI. RELATED WORK
Several schemes studied security and privacy [7]–[12].
Other approaches have been adopted to perform hardware
Trojan attacks on pre-trained DLA implemented on hardware.
Zou et al. [4] proposes a hardware Trojan on pre-trained
models ready for hardware mapping called PoTrojan. In this
approach, an input image is designed to be the trigger for the
hardware Trojan. When the Trojan is triggered, the payload is
designed to add minimal extra neurals and synapses to targeted
layer(s) of the hardware design of the DLA. Without access
to the training instances, the input image trigger is designed
by using reverse engineering algorithms to obtain the layer-
by-layer outputs of the DLA to obtain samples of the input
image. This approach requires additional hardware resource to
accommodate additional synapses once the Trojan is triggered
which shows a risk of its detection. The approach also requires
Parameter Sensitivity Analysis (PSA) to determine the appro-
priate layer to add stealthy and effective malicious synapses
that can be stealthy and effective.
Clements et. al [6] proposes a hardware Trojan attack on
neural networks that is targeted at specific layer(s). The attack
is targeted at pre-trained neural networks that can be mapped
to hardware accelerators. Here, adversarial images to fool
the DLA are generated and used to determine the required
perturbations needed to be added to the layer-by-layer output
to cause mis-classification. In this approach, the Trojan is
triggered with input images and upon triggering, the payload
the malicious perturbations are added to the feature maps
of the layers of the DLA. This approach requires additional
hardware resource to accommodate addition of perturbations
once the Trojan is triggered which shows a risk to its detection.
The approach also requires PSA to determine the appropriate
layer to add perturbations to that will make the attack stealthy
and effective.
Clements et. al [13] proposes a hardware Trojan design on
neural networks that is targeted at computational blocks or ac-
tivation function of specific layer(s) to cause mis-classification.
This approach also tampers with the layers of the DLA to
cause malicious behavior. Their approach requires layer-by-
layer PSA to determine the appropriate layer and activation
function that can be attacked to achieve stealthy and effective
attack.
Zhao et. al [14] proposes a memory Trojan attack on
hardware accelerators. In this approach, the Trojan is located
in the memory controller and is triggered by specific input
images. After the Trojan is triggered, the payload inserts error
in the layer-by-layer feature maps to cause mis-classification.
This approach also tampers with the layer-by-layer feature
map of the DLA to cause the malicious behavior. To achieve
this layer-by-layer PSA to determine the appropriate layer that
can be attacked to achieve stealthy and effective attack. The
addition of erroneous data will require additional hardware
resource which can lead to detection.
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF COMPARISON WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART TECHNIQUES
Metrics [4] [6] [13] [14] IIA
Designed without PSA x x x x X
Require no change in DLA parameters x x x x X
Require no change in activation functions x x x x X
Require no additional hardware after trigger x x x x X
These above state-of-the-art approaches in the related work
are compared with the proposed methodology. The Table of
comparison is shown in Table III.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we propose a hardware Trojan attack called
the Input Interception Attack (IIA). This attack performs
a statistical analysis on the layer-by-layer output of DLA
to obtain stealthy trigger conditions for the design of the
Trojan. This attack is a Gray box attack that is carried out
in the hardware implementation stage of DLA architecture.
This attack is demonstrated on two DLA used to perform
classification on MNIST and Cifar-10 data sets. The IIA
proved to be stealthy and adds negligible hardware overhead.
This paper also proposes potential defense mechanisms to help
combat this attack and other Trojan insertion techniques.
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